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0 Executive Summary 
 
Heritage crime has been defined as any offence which harms the value of England's heritage assets 
and their settings to this and future generations. There has been growing concern at the risks of crime 
and anti-social behaviour faced by designated heritage assets, but the true extent of heritage crime had 
remained difficult to measure.  
   
This study collated and analysed data on damage from criminal behaviour to heritage assets in England. 
The report provides a review of the data collection procedures undertaken by the study to identify those 
that are most effective in building understanding of the scale and nature of heritage crime. The report then 
tries to answer a series of key questions about heritage crime. Finally there are some conclusions and 
selective recommendations aimed at improving future understanding of heritage crime.  
  
This study has trialled five main different data collection processes, aiming to find ‘what works’ for potential 
repeat research in future years:  
 stratified survey of heritage asset owners and guardians  
 web searches  
 e-survey of interested organisations and others  
 survey of local authorities in relation to unlawful development   
 collation of other data.  
  
These innovative heritage crime data collection activities yielded an unprecedented volume of information, 
which have been processed into two main data types:   
 responses from the stratified sample of heritage asset owners/guardians to a phone survey  
 collated database of individual heritage crimes.   
   
The primary value of the crime database is in its provision of extra, more qualitative, information beyond 
that obtainable from the stratified survey. The empirical material is drawn on to answer in turn the specific 
questions that the study has addressed.   
   
How prevalent is heritage crime in different types of area?   
 heritage assets located in central urban areas face the risks common to all buildings in such areas   
 heritage crime risk does not vary very consistently between broad areas of the country  
 in areas with few heritage assets (eg. many deprived areas), assets face higher heritage crime risk  
 in-depth research is needed to assess further the true level of unauthorised developments to assets  
   
What type of heritage crime is most prevalent?  
 criminal damage makes up the bulk of all heritage crime  
 the risk of criminal damage to heritage assets is substantially greater in more deprived areas   
 the frequency of metal theft also warrants separate consideration  
 metal theft is higher where historic assets are few, and in particular in the North  
 
What types of heritage asset are most affected by crime?  
 variation in overall heritage crime risk was slight between most heritage asset types  
 criminal damage is the main heritage crime risk for Listed Buildings and in Conservation Areas  
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 damage by owners due to unauthorised changes is a non-trivial element of the total picture  
 metal theft is not a great risk to buildings in Conservation Areas that are not individually designated 
 Scheduled Monuments are different to other heritage assets, in being at rather low risk of metal 
theft and criminal damage, and higher risk of other crime such as unauthorised metal detecting  
  
What type of heritage crime most affects each type of heritage asset?    
 criminal damage is the main heritage crime risk for all use types of heritage assets except farms  
 religious buildings stand out with their higher risk of criminal damage and, most notably, metal theft   
 some of the evidence points to a higher risk for buildings that are unoccupied for more of the time  
 otherwise the risk ‘profile’ by heritage crime types and ASB does not vary greatly by building usage  
  
What can be said on the extent of different types of impact of heritage crime?  
 variation in risk of higher impact crime was slight between most heritage asset types  
 criminal damage is the main risk leading to impact on all asset types   
 arson is infrequent but can have huge monetary costs and damaging impacts on the fabric  
 metal theft can also have significant ‘secondary’ effects beyond the direct cost of replacement  
 evidence on BT Listed call boxes shows repair costs per incident varying little by area, but incidence 
varies in the ways seen before (higher in more urban, more deprived and less historic areas)  
  
What is known about links between socio-economic trends and recent trends in heritage crime?  
 the trend itself remains uncertain  
 little is confidently known of factors ‘driving’ heritage crime trends generally  
 it appears that metal theft is a growing problem, and this is linkable to wholesale metal price trends  
 overall acquisitive crime levels may have changed little, but a ‘diversion‘ to metal theft may also 
mean a ‘diversion’ towards heritage crime because of the amount of lead on historic roofs 
 
The final part of the report draws together observations and recommendations about ‘what worked’ in the 
data collection processes, and then sketches a small number of reflections on the data needed by those 
tackling heritage crime, and some further research which may assist them.  
  
Is it possible to instigate common practices in heritage crime data recording?  
The most directly relevant enhancement of official crime recording could be the introduction of a specific 
question as to whether a heritage asset was involved in the crime. Agreed terminology allows keyword 
searches to be efficient and to yield robust results, and a new terminology has been devised for the collated 
crimes database of this study. An ideal development would be for all future British Crime Surveys to include 
an indicator of the heritage status (or otherwise) of the location of each respondent.  
   
Are there implications from the study for broader issues related to heritage crime?  
The most fundamental question – which has not been addressed by this study – is whether “heritage crime” 
should be specifically recognised in law, rather than be covered either directly or in part by a large number 
of separate strands of legislation.   
  
Should there be continual or repeated heritage crime data collection?  
Several of the sources accessed in this study are, for various reasons, unlikely to produce statistical data 
from which robust estimates of national prevalence can be produced. Heritage Asset owners and guardians 
6 
 
could be re-surveyed on a regular basis, but other data gathering efforts would incur lower cost and could 
be a valuable way of keeping aware of emerging concern. There are also non-statistical reasons for further 
information gathering, where this is a focus of partnership building activities.   
   
Are there other opportunities for improving intelligence on heritage crime?  
Police Forces have the technical skills required to perform analysis on data they already have, but this 
would be helped if heritage asset owners and guardians were to consistently report incidents: this study 
found that 1 in 3 of the heritage crimes recalled in the survey had not been reported.   
   
Should there be other heritage crime research studies following up points raised here?  
Crimes on heritage assets in a marine environment will only be adequately researched by a separate 
dedicated study. Another type of heritage crime requiring a specific study would be the use of metal 
detectors for illegal activities detrimental to archaeology. The study also leads to the suggestion of research 
on the scale of unlawful developments to heritage assets by their owners or guardians. Finally there is the 
possibility of comparative research to assess whether the patterns in heritage crime found in this study are 
limited to England, although such studies would need to take into account the variations in legislation 
between different jurisdictions in the British Isles.
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1 Research Context 
 
Heritage crime is defined1 as follows: any offence which harms the value of England's heritage assets 
and their settings to this and future generations.  
 
There is a growing body of evidence that the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour facing designated 
heritage assets has grown considerably in recent years.  However the true extent of heritage crime has 
proved difficult to measure. 
  
It is in response to the importance of heritage crime, and the limitations of existing knowledge, that this 
research aimed to significantly improve understanding of both the extent and the nature of heritage crime. 
This study has collated and analysed data on damage caused through criminal behaviour to heritage 
assets in England. The aim is to: 
 extend the knowledge base on criminal damage to heritage assets in England 
 improve understanding of the level of risk to different types of heritage asset 
 examine the levels of crime on heritage assets in different types of area and different regions 
 test alternative approaches to gathering data on heritage crime, and then 
 provide suggestions relating to the future collection and collation of heritage crime data.  
 
The study has sought to cover all forms of designated heritage asset, both terrestrial and marine: 
 World Heritage Sites  
 Scheduled Monuments 
 Listed Buildings  
 Registered Parks and Gardens  
 Registered Battlefields  
 Protected military remains of aircraft and vessels of historic interest 
 Protected wreck sites  
 Conservation Areas. 
  
The next part of this report reviews the data collection procedures undertaken by the study to identify those 
that are most effective in building understanding of the scale and nature of heritage crime. In the following 
part of the report, the findings from these data collection efforts are set out within a framework which seeks 
to answer a series of key questions about heritage crime. Finally the report outlines some conclusions and, 
in particular, makes some recommendations aimed at improving future understanding of heritage crime. 
(The report also includes Annexes with more detailed information on the data gathering by this study.) 
                                                 
1
 www.english-heritage.org.uk/professional/advice/advice-by-topic/heritage-crime  
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2 Strategic Evaluation  
 
This study has trialled five main different data collection processes, aiming to find ‘what works’ for potential 
repeat research in future years: 
 survey of heritage asset owners and guardians (Annex 1) 
 web searches 
 e-survey of interested organisations and others 
 survey of local authorities in relation to unlawful development  
 collation of other data. 
Undertaking this range of data collection has produced not only valuable empirical results but also the basis 
for some recommendation on future data collection, which will be outlined in the last part of the report. 
 
These processes have produced two main types of data output:  
 responses from the stratified sample of heritage asset owners/guardians to a phone survey 
 collated database of individual heritage crimes (Annex 2).  
One data collection method for generating the latter type of data – cases of crimes – involved contacting 
heritage interest groups in the voluntary sector, such as local history groups, archaeological societies, 
metal detecting and diving clubs, or groups which focus on a particular period (eg. Victorian Societies). 
  
Some of these groups were particularly important as potential sources of information on heritage sectors 
where information tends to be limited viz: heritage which is below ground or in the marine environment. 
Before evaluating the more straightforward data collection processes, it is useful to consider separately 
these two sector-specific heritage crime data collection challenges. A final section of this part of the report 
then looks at the prospects for future updating of the data collection processes trialled by this study. 
 
2.1  Heritage crime with severely limited evidence: crimes at marine sites 
 
Marine heritage assets include protected wrecks and military remains (including designated war graves), 
plus other submerged archaeology. Considerable legal requirements and constraints affect marine and 
marine heritage, ranging from the broad Merchant Shipping Act 1995 to the specific Protection of Military 
Remains Act 1986. This legal context means that there are many potential offences, but the web search 
together with intelligence from English Heritage and other sources only identified 13 incidents altogether, 
and these related to just 7 sites in English territorial waters (nb. 1 related to a wreck designated as UK 
property but located in Danish territorial waters).  
 
The offences identified included vandalism, tampering with a wreck, theft and illegal diving. Of these 13 
incidents just 3 had resulted in formal warning or caution, although another 3 were still under investigation. 
There may be substantial under-reporting of heritage crime in the marine sector, but this is inevitably 
difficult to prove. One possibly indicative case is referred to in the following extract from a report by the 
Receiver of Wreck who worked in partnership with English Heritage and both Kent and Essex Police. 
“[in]…search and seize operations across Kent, including five private addresses, two business 
addresses and two vessels… [h]undreds of items of unreported wreck material were seized from  
the properties, including several 16th century bronze cannon, metal ingots and WWII ammunition” 
      (Tye, pers. comm., 25th November 2011) 
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The remoteness of many marine heritage sites allows heritage crime to occur unobserved, and in fact the 
heritage assets themselves may not be fully documented, so that damage or theft is not readily identified. 
There are also British wrecks that lie outside British territorial waters, and there are reports2 of unauthorised 
salvage work at historic wrecks (including designated war graves). The overall conclusion then is that the 
evidence on the scale and nature of marine heritage crime remains elusive. The fact that few incidents 
were found by this study partly reflects its limited timeframe and very wide ranging brief: a more dedicated 
in-depth study would be needed to measure marine heritage crime robustly.  
 
2.2  Heritage crime with severely limited evidence: unauthorised metal detecting 
 
Another type of heritage crime considered by the research was the use of metal detectors for illegal 
activities detrimental to archaeology. Some earlier research3 found limited public reporting of unauthorised 
metal detecting, which they termed ‘nighthawking’ and described as: 
“the illegal search for and removal of antiquities from the ground by criminals using metal detectors, 
without the permission of the landowners, or on prohibited ground such as Scheduled Monuments.” 
  
In the present study an e-survey was sent to a broad range of potential respondents, including several 
metal-detector user groups, while information was also sought from the English Heritage CONCASE 
database which monitors any form of damage to Scheduled Monuments. Despite the fact that unauthorised 
metal detecting has attracted much attention in the media and the archaeological sector, relatively few 
cases can be confidently identified in the available sources of information as heritage crime due to 
unauthorised metal detecting, although there are some reports of an increasing number of prosecutions. 
  
Previous research suggested4 that numerous offences may occur unseen and unreported. Some evidence 
of under-reporting can be seen in the fact that the survey of heritage asset owners/guardians found five 
Scheduled Monuments where it was said there had been unauthorised metal detecting, but of these only 
one incident appears in the list of such cases on CONCASE. One factor that often leads to under-reporting 
is that there is no easily recognised damage or loss – as perhaps with the cases reported to the survey – 
but survey respondents may not have had the knowledge to appreciate the damage caused by disturbing 
the buried archaeology, quite apart from any unrecorded removal of archaeological material. A fuller and 
more consistent dataset will become more probable if heritage and law enforcement practitioners record 
these forms of crime comprehensively using an agreed set of appropriate categories.  
 
2.3  Overview of the evidence on heritage crime collected by this study 
 
This part of the report now concludes by reviewing data collection processes undertaken more generally.  
Table 1 shows that the survey of the stratified sample of heritage asset owners/guardians survey is the only 
data collection process providing the basis for quantitative analyses of heritage crime incidence, along with 
the locational and other characteristics of the crime recalled by survey respondents. Annex 1 outlines the 
                                                 
2
 see for example, BBC (2010) “Unlicensed salvagers 'biggest threat' to HMS Victory” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/guernsey/8687441.stm 
3
 Oxford Archaeology (2009) “Nighthawks and Nighthawking: damage to archaeological sites in the UK and Crown 
Dependencies caused by illegal searching and removal of antiquities” 
www.helm.org.uk/upload/pdf/NIGHTHAWKS2.pdf?1274873077  
4
 Dobinson C & Denison S (1995) “Metal Detecting and Archaeology in England”  
http://old.britarch.ac.uk/detecting/cont.html 
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nature of the stratification procedures that were adopted to maximise the robustness of this dataset as the 
basis for the key findings reported here on the scale and nature of heritage crime. In broad terms, it seems 
that the survey has generated useful data whose results – reported in the next part of this report – are close 
enough to expectations (based on other research) for the survey to be considered a successful process. 
This evaluation means that the process could be repeated, annually or rather less frequently; the decision 
as to whether this would be valuable then depends on the purpose for which updated data may be needed, 
as emphasised in the final part of this report. 
 
Table 1 is predominantly composed of entries reporting data collection or collection processes which have 
generated data for the database of heritage crimes. The very fact that this database has been populated 
from a wide variety of different sources makes it unlikely to be able to support quantitative analyses whose 
results can be considered representative of designated heritage assets generally. Table 1 in fact shows 
that several of the data collection processes did not generate the anticipated information on the issues that 
they were intended to cover: some have in fact yet to produce any data, others generated disappointingly 
low numbers of cases. Annex 2 provides summary information on each of these data collection processes, 
including some evaluation of strengths and weaknesses which lead to preliminary recommendations on the 
value of repeating that data collection process in the near future.  
   
Table 1   Data collection and collation processes trialled by this study (2011) 
  
data usable 
for primary 
quantitative 
analysis of 
incidence? 
crime case 
records 
aimed at 
qualitative 
analyses? 
process 
simple 
and 
relatively 
low cost? 
yielded 
worthwhile 
data 
volume 
here? 
break-
down by 
asset and 
crime 
types? 
text (etc) 
content 
adding 
to case 
counts? 
stratified phone survey of heritage 
asset owners/guardians yes yes no yes  yes  yes  
ARCH members who are major 
owners of heritage assets no yes no some some some 
web search no yes yes  yes  some yes  
planning enforcement officer survey no yes yes  yes  yes  no 
planning process datasets no yes yes  yes  yes  no 
CONCASE no yes yes  yes  yes  yes  
English Heritage crime team no yes yes  no yes  yes  
places of worship at risk no yes yes  yes  no yes  
Church of England no yes no some no no 
local authorities no yes yes  no yes  some  
heritage interest groups  no yes yes  no no no 
Insurers no yes yes  no yes  no 
Police Forces no yes no some some no 
Product Providers no ! yes  no ! ! 
source: CURDS data collection and process evaluation    ! : data not provided 
 
 
Table 1 also takes some account of the cost of each data collection process, although none of those listed 
is so costly that it can be discounted for this reason alone. Put another way, the onus will be on a sponsor 
to identify exactly why they may need repeated data collection, because the strength of this need will be the 
yard-stick against which to measure whether the data collection cost is too high or not. In the absence here  
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of such an identified need it seems reasonable to assume that most data collection should be relatively low 
cost for it to be actively recommended. There may also be ‘hidden’ costs such as the need to devote time 
to limit the inevitable duplication that arises when collating information from a range of sources, as was the 
case for this study in compiling a crime database. In practice, the primary value of the crime database here 
is in its provision of extra, more qualitative, information beyond that obtainable from the stratified survey. 
Combining all these considerations means that the data collection procedures which are the most plausible 
candidates for repeat data collection in the near future are those without a “no” in any of the 4 right-hand 
columns of Table 1.  
  
Along with this evaluation of the data collection processes as ways to collect data, it is also relevant to look 
at their value simply as processes. Here the key point is that most such procedures involve a sponsoring 
organisation and another organisation that provides the actual data. Such arrangements are the basis for 
partnership working and that mode of working is almost certain to be essential in developing an effective 
response to heritage crime, given that it impacts upon so many differing organisations (as shown by the 
range of membership of ARCH). As a result, if there is little real cost in regularly sharing data then even 
though the data may be of modest research value this sharing may have value by way of further developing 
important partnership working.  
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3 Detailed Results 
 
This part of the report presents empirical findings from the study. In a first sub-section there is an overview 
of the relative strengths of: 
~ the collated database of heritage crime cases 
~ the survey data from the sample of heritage asset owners and guardians. 
  
In the following sub-sections of the report, the empirical results are drawn on to answer in turn the specific 
questions that the study has addressed.   
How prevalent is heritage crime in different types of area? [see report section 3.2] 
What type of heritage crime is most prevalent? [see 3.3] 
Which types of heritage asset are most affected by crime? [see 3.4] 
What type of heritage crime most affects each type of heritage asset? [see 3.5] 
What can be said about the extent of different types of impact of heritage crime? [see 3.6] 
What is known about links between socio-economic trends and recent trends in heritage crime? [see 3.7] 
 
3.1 Scope of the evidence collected by the study 
 
The strands of research described so far are marine heritage crime and unauthorised metal detecting: 
neither strand has produced the volume of data that was sought, but both strands have contributed some 
cases to a database of heritage crimes. This database also includes crimes recalled by respondents to the 
survey of heritage asset owners and guardians (nb. survey respondents were promised confidentiality and 
so no verbatim comments have been included in this report). Annex 2 provides an outline of the sources 
drawn on in compiling the crimes database, ranging from targeted requests for information from ARCH 
members to general web searches. Considerable research effort was devoted to limiting the inevitable 
duplication that arises when collating information from a range of sources when several may cite the same 
heritage crime (eg. a media report and an insurance claim). This diversity of data sources has also resulted 
in data coverage varying across different crime types, different parts of the country and different heritage 
asset types. The uneven coverage means that the database cannot be analysed as if it were representative 
of national patterns of crime risk. Its value mainly lies in some of the more detailed information on specific 
crimes. The aim in compiling the crimes database was to only include evidenced cases – excluding any 
reports which are simply ‘anecdotal’ – but even so it is not a robust basis for statistical forms of analysis, 
due to unavoidable doubts about the representativeness of the cases reported in the media, for example. 
   
Parallel to the database of heritage crimes is the dataset of responses to the telephone survey of owners 
and guardians of heritage assets. Annex 1 describes the way in which the sample for the survey was 
stratified so as to represent different types of asset in different parts of the country. Although this sampling 
strategy meant that the resulting dataset included responses from a wide diversity of assets, this does not 
make it proportionally representative of the national ‘population’ of heritage assets. This means that a case 
can be made for weighting the data so that the results in the tables below come closer to those that might 
have been obtained from a comprehensive national survey. Annex 1 presents an illustrative weighting 
(Table B): for example, the few Registered Parks & Gardens covered in this survey would actually need 
down-weighting because their small share of this sample actually constitutes over-sampling (due to this 
type of asset being an even smaller proportion of all assets nationally). The illustration ends by showing 
that for the ‘headline’ result of the overall risk rate of heritage crime in the last year, there is very little 
difference between the answers from the unweighted and the weighted analyses. A weighting schema 
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requires making numerous estimations in order to reduce over-sampling and also may give the impression 
that the results are then more ‘definitive’ than is in fact possible. On balance these disadvantages outweigh 
any benefit from slightly altering the results by weighting, so in the interests of transparency all the analyses 
in the main body of this report are based on unweighted data.  
 
3.2  How prevalent is heritage crime in different types of area?  
 
A starting point here is the likelihood that some well-established geographical patterns in crime incidence5 – 
such as the higher rates of crime which typify more deprived neighbourhoods – will play a role in the spatial 
patterns of heritage crime. In other words, any heritage asset in an area which is generally at high crime 
risk can also be expected to be at higher risk, other things being equal. As a result, a necessary preliminary 
analysis is to test whether certain heritage assets are more or less likely to be in deprived neighbourhoods. 
The official measure of neighbourhood deprivation in England is the Index of Multiple Deprivation 6 (IMD). 
This measure is available for over 35,000 areas called Lower-layer Super Output Areas7 (LSOAs) that were 
specifically designed by the Office for National Statistics to have very similarly sized populations so they 
would be suitable for reporting ‘neighbourhood’ scale statistics. The categories of heritage asset that cover 
the most assets are Listed Buildings (which have been assigned the IMD values of their ‘home’ LSOAs) 
and also Conservation Areas (whose variable size made it necessary to find those which encompass whole 
Output Areas – the ‘building blocks’ of LSOAs – and assign to each the IMD value of the respective LSOA).  
  
Figure 1 uses a division of LSOAs into three equal shares, which have respectively high, middling or low 
levels of IMD. This then shows very clearly that only about 15% of all Listed Buildings are located in the 
third of LSOAs with high values of IMD. The proportions are very similar for the two main divisions of the 
Listed Buildings: the relatively few Grade I or Grade II* assets of the highest heritage value, and the much 
more numerous Grade II Listed Buildings. In marked contrast, very nearly 30% of the Conservation Areas 
are in the third of LSOAs where the IMD values are high. It is possible that this reflects a greater tendency  
 
Figure 1   Relative deprivation of the neighbourhoods around key types of heritage assets (2011)  
 
source: CURDS analyses of English Heritage data on heritage asset location, plus the IMD data from cited web-site 
[“other crime” n=1359889 ASB n=1779877]  
                                                 
5
 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011  
6
 www.communities.gov.uk/communities/research/indicesdeprivation/deprivation10  
7
 www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-guide/census/super-output-areas--soas-/index.html  
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for there to be Conservation Areas (as opposed to many Listed Buildings) in the inner areas of large cities 
where many of the more deprived neighbourhoods are found. Whether or not this is the case, the patterns 
do indicate that Conservation Areas are more exposed than Listed Buildings to the crime risks associated 
with being located where deprivation levels are high. 
 
A key reason for undertaking this study was that none of the existing major crime data sources separates 
out heritage crime from other offences, so the evidence on higher crime levels in more deprived areas does 
not rule out the possibility that some heritage crime types may have very different geographical patterns. 
The theft of metals, and especially lead, from churches has raised much concerns recently but national 
data on the problem is elusive (eg. it is part of “other stealing” in standard datasets8). Yet there is evidence9 
that a potentially related problem – metal theft from railways – is very unevenly distributed over the country. 
This study has obtained comprehensive data on metal theft from railways and has calculated its incidence 
as a proportion of the length of railway track within each police force area: Figure 2 shows these values, 
joining them together with a blue line. The bars in the chart represent the overall “other stealing” crime rate 
per thousand residents in the same areas, and the areas are sorted according to these values.  
  
As may be expected, high rates of “other stealing” tend to be found in the most urban areas – which include 
many of the most deprived areas – with the Metropolitan Police Service area having the highest rate of all, 
at nearly three times the rate of the lowest area (Cumbria). However this level of contrast is a pale shadow 
of that found for railway metal thefts, whose rates vary hugely between police force areas. This is readily 
illustrated by the cases of two areas whose very similar values on the “other stealing” values place them 
next to each other in the middle of the chart: Sussex and Cleveland. Railway metal theft levels in Cleveland  
 
Figure 2   Metal theft from railways and recorded “other stealing” by police force area (2010-2011) 
 
source: CURDS analyses of unpublished British Transport Police data plus HMIC data from cited web-site 
[“other crime” n=1359889 ASB n=1779877]  
                                                 
8
 www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12879764  
9
 www.hmic.gov.uk/data/crime-and-policing-comparator-data 
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are more than 25 times higher than those in Sussex. Figure 2 shows the national average on both these 
crime rate measures at the same height on the chart, and this dramatises how much more dramatically the 
railway metal theft rate varies by area than is the case for the “other stealing” rate measure. Thefts of metal 
are highly relevant to many heritage assets, most especially churches, and it seems likely that thieves only 
‘see’ the metal and not the heritage, so the degree of localisation in crime risk calls for further investigation. 
 
In the last year the Home Office has made available highly detailed locational data10 on recorded crimes. 
There are two key limitations of this data for heritage crime analysis; firstly that the locational detail is still 
insufficient for the crimes affecting heritage assets to be confidently separated out, and secondly that the 
breakdown of crime types is very limited. In practice, the category of greatest interest here is the “other” 
crimes which are those that are not separately identified as Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) or as violent crime, 
for example. Although this category is by no means ideal for the purposes of this study, national data11 
reveals that “other thefts” make the largest contribution to it. Another crime type of importance to heritage 
assets is criminal damage, and over three-quarters of all “other” crimes are either criminal damage or one 
of the “other thefts” so this “other crimes” category is substantially relevant here. (It is of course true that the 
data could be still more valuable if its coding policies changed to explicitly identify heritage crime.) 
  
Figure 3 shows the variation in the incidence of crimes of different types between neighbourhoods, after all 
LSOAs (neighbourhoods) in the country were grouped according to their relative level of deprivation (IMD). 
The broken green line is a reminder that there are fewer Listed Buildings in more deprived areas (Figure 1 
had shown this earlier). The other lines all show higher values for the high IMD areas and it is very notable 
that the link with deprivation is more acute for some crime types than others. It is seen that ASB rates climb 
the most steeply but the relationship between IMD and the “other” crimes category that is the most relevant 
to heritage crime is almost as strong. By way of comparison, the burglary rate of a neighbourhood is far 
less strongly determined by its relative level of deprivation. 
 
Figure 3   Recorded crimes per area (2010-11) 
 
source: CURDS analysis of Home Office (December 2010 – October 2011) data at cited direct.gov.uk web-site 
[“other” crime n=1359889 ASB n=1779877 Burglary n=317556]  
 
                                                 
10
 www.direct.gov.uk/en/Diol1/DoItOnline/WP/DG_WP193625    
11
 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/user-guide-
crime-statistics  
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Table 2 further examines the geographical distributions of the two relevant crime types discussed above’ 
showing that both “other” crimes and ASB occur more often in neighbourhoods of London as well as those 
in the North (especially for ASB). These regional patterns not only reflect the higher average deprivation 
levels of London and the North but also their greater degree of urbanisation. Table 2 shows lower down 
that both “other” crime and ASB are far more frequent in areas with high ‘scores’ on the IMD (as had been 
indicated in Figure 3) but also that there are substantial urban/rural contrasts in their rates of incidence.  
  
It is not a new finding that crime levels are higher in more deprived neighbourhoods and more urban areas, 
but it is a sound starting-point for these analyses. Table 2 goes on to break new ground by analysing two 
heritage-specific characteristics of LSOAs. First the locations of all Listed Buildings were analysed and, 
using this data, LSOAs were divided into four groups according to how many Listed Buildings each housed. 
Despite the fact that Listed Buildings make up a higher proportion of the built environment in southern rural 
areas than in more urban areas or the north – where crime rates tend to be higher – ASB and especially 
“other crime” incidents prove to be more prevalent in LSOAs with more Listed Buildings. To create another 
heritage-specific indicator the study sought to identify those LSOAs whose character is markedly affected 
by including a Conservation Area (CA). Here again there is what may be regarded as an unexpected result, 
with both “other” crime and ASB considerably higher in those LSOAs with the CAs. 
  
These analyses are presented essentially as context: they are very indirect measures of heritage crime 
(and not only because “other” crime includes a wide range of offences but, more importantly, because they 
relate to whole LSOAs, in all of which heritage assets are a fairly small minority of the built environment). 
Table 2 concludes with two new forms of analysis which produced surprising results of considerable 
interest. The key to interpreting these results is perhaps the fact that Conservation Areas are very often 
found in or near town and city centres. The range of ASB and “other” crime offences includes many that 
occur frequently in the High Street areas where, of course, the relatively few Listed Buildings in urban areas 
tend to be found. To summarise here: this broad group of officially recorded crimes occurs most frequently 
in town and city centres where the (relatively few) heritage assets of urban areas are often concentrated. 
 
 Table 2    Recorded crime incidence by type of area (2010-11) 
     average number of crimes per LSOA:  “other” crime  ASB 
England 41.9 54.8 
   
London 58.2 63.1 
rest of South 37.1 46.9 
Midlands 39.4 52.0 
North 41.5 62.6 
   
urban areas (>10,000 residents) 46.7 60.5 
town and fringe areas 23.2 37.4 
villages, hamlets and isolated dwellings 18.6 22.4 
   
high IMD 65.3 89.1 
middling IMD 38.1 47.5 
low IMD 22.3 27.9 
   
7-637 Listed Buildings 57.9 60.8 
2-6 Listed Buildings 41.7 55.4 
1 Listed Building 37.8 53.7 
no Listed Buildings 33.5 51.3 
   
at least 1 of its OAs entirely within a  Conservation Area 97.6 91.9 
none of its OAs entirely within a  Conservation Area 40.2 53.7 
source: CURDS analysis of Home Office (December 2010 – October 2011) data at cited direct.gov.uk web-site 
[“other” crime n=1359889 ASB n=1779877]  
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To move beyond the contextual analyses reported so far it is necessary to focus in from analyses of areas 
such as LSOAs to analyses of heritage assets themselves. Table 3 introduces these analyses by showing 
the variation by types of area in unsuccessful appeals against planning controls on developments of either 
Listed Buildings or other buildings in Conservation Areas (Annex 2 details the data source and its nature). 
The values in the left-hand column are similar to those presented in the previous table in that they are 
averages per LSOA: these are not particularly informative in this case because the real ‘population at risk’ 
is mostly limited to Listed Buildings whose numbers, unlike the counts of buildings generally, vary wildly 
from one LSOA to another.  
  
Table 3 has its right-hand column emboldened to draw attention to the more indicative values presented, 
with the number of unsuccessful appeals against Listed Building enforcement proceedings here expressed 
as a percentage of all local Listed Buildings. London is then seen to have a much more acute problem than 
other parts of the country, although the next section of Table 3 shows that Listed Buildings in urban areas 
generally are at a higher risk than those in more rural areas. There is also a raised risk in more deprived 
areas and in general areas with few Listed Buildings. Despite this dataset being entirely different to that 
from the Home Office analysed above (Table 2) it can be seen that some of the variations in levels of risk 
are similar: the highest risks are in the deprived areas and urban areas generally (and London especially). 
Tables 2 and 4 differ most in the risk levels which they identify in Conservation Areas. 
  
Table 3 Unsuccessful appeals relating to listed buildings and Conservation Areas (2006-11) 
      average no. 
per LSOA 
% of Listed 
Buildings 
England 0.0133 0.1148 
   
London 0.0176 0.4408 
rest of South 0.0194 0.1050 
Midlands 0.0089 0.0858 
North 0.0062 0.0836 
   
urban areas (>10,000 residents) 0.0104 0.2000 
town and fringe areas 0.0195 0.0953 
villages, hamlets and isolated dwellings 0.0329 0.0552 
   
high IMD 0.0108 0.2287 
middling IMD 0.0168 0.1084 
low IMD 0.0123 0.0846 
   
7-637 Listed Buildings 0.0485 0.1162 
2-6 Listed Buildings 0.0027 0.0807 
1 Listed Building 0.0015 0.1482 
no Listed Buildings 0.0001 Null 
   
at least 1 of its OAs entirely within a  Conservation Area 0.1074 0.2924 
none of its OAs entirely within a  Conservation Area 0.0105 0.0969 
source: CURDS analysis of Enforcement Notice Appeals relating to listed buildings (November 2006 – October 2011) 
Planning Inspectorate Database [n=418] 
 
Turning to the survey of heritage asset owners and guardians, its sample was stratified so as to provide 
adequate coverage of neighbourhoods within three dimensions highlighted in the preceding discussion: 
regional location, relative deprivation and heritage character (the HBE measure). Table 4 uses these 
dimensions in showing headline results from the survey. To make the data as indicative as possible the 
responses have been grouped into three categories: 
 heritage crime, which includes all types of crime directly endangering the fabric of a heritage asset 
 ASB (these were largely cases of noisiness or littering, for example by groups of youths)  
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 other theft etc, including all other crimes mentioned (nb. this is largely composed of incidental thefts 
of non-heritage property at heritage sites, such as the possessions of visitors to a historic house).  
 
It can be seen that some of the results of the survey do not readily accord with familiar findings from broad 
crime pattern analyses. A notable surprise is the low crime rate reported in London for all three crime types. 
The survey encountered most difficulty in fulfilling sample size requirements in London and this may explain 
these results, with the repeated non-response from initially selected cases meaning repeated substitution 
by other cases and this could then lead to a ‘skewing’ towards certain types of case who were more likely 
to respond. At the same time, it may also be that because most heritage assets in London are in very busy 
areas they genuinely are at low risk of more visible types of crimes. In any case, the variation of heritage 
crime rate between these broad regions is not great. The results do conform to expectations with higher 
crime rates in more deprived areas, although the difference for ASB is surprisingly slight (nb. coupled with 
the high ASB rate seen in the South outside the capital, it is possible that it is more likely that fairly minor 
incidents have been reported as ASB in these relatively affluent and less urban areas).  
  
Table 4 ends by looking at the relationship between reported crime rates and the historic character of the 
built environment around the surveyed historic assets. Each asset location is classified by HBE: a measure 
developed in previous studies12 for English Heritage. The results from the survey in terms of ASB echo 
those using the Home Office data and a count of Listed Buildings in each LSOA (Table 2): more historic 
local environments have higher levels of ASB. However the results on heritage crime differ from those seen 
previously with the heritage assets in low HBE areas reporting the highest rates (Table 4). In fact the single 
set of results with which the study comes closest to a direct measure of heritage crime are these shown in 
the lower left-hand corner of Table 4. Here the results are only from heritage assets, they are from a 
carefully stratified sample, and they only include crimes which may directly impact on the heritage fabric. 
The result is strong evidence that heritage crime is more prevalent where the heritage asset is a rare 
feature of the local environment. Table 4 had also showed high heritage crime risk in more deprived areas, 
and such areas will also often have few historic assets. This pattern is consistent with the results from 
analysing the Home Office recorded crime data (Table 2).  
 
Table 4    Percent of heritage asset owners/guardians who recalled a crime in the last year (2010-11) 
% heritage crime ASB other theft etc 
England 17.9 12.3 11.7 
    
London 14.1 7.0 10.2 
rest of South 19.8 17.1 12.8 
Midlands 16.3 9.9 14.2 
North 20.3 13.1 9.2 
    
high IMD 26.2 13.9 12.3 
middling IMD 15.0 11.9 11.5 
low IMD 13.3 11.3 11.3 
    
high HBE 14.6 13.8 13.4 
middling HBE 16.6 11.6 11.6 
low HBE 24.6 10.8 9.0 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
 
It is helpful to summarise the key findings in this section of the report. 
 heritage assets located in central urban areas face the risks common to all buildings in such areas  
                                                 
12
 www.english-heritage.org.uk/publications/historic-buildings-young-people/  
    hc.english-heritage.org.uk/content/pub/sense_of_place_web.pdf  
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 heritage crime risk does not vary very consistently between broad regions of the country 
 in areas with few heritage assets (eg. many deprived areas), assets face higher heritage crime risk 
 in-depth research would be needed to assess the true level of unauthorised developments to assets 
 
 
3.3  What type of heritage crime is most prevalent? 
 
The survey of historic asset owners/guardians (Annex 1) makes possible an analysis of types of heritage 
crime but the ways in which the respondents described crimes inevitably varied greatly. It is necessary then 
to group the reported incidents into types of crime along similar lines to those used for the relevant official 
statistics so, for example, a category of criminal damage is used (this covers reported incidents which were 
largely either vandalism or graffiti). Table 5 reports the relative prevalence of incidents of these crime types 
(note that the values for the three types typically sum to rather more than the equivalent value for [all] 
heritage crime in Table 4 because some respondents said they had been affected by crimes of more than 
one type). The clearest conclusion from these statistics is that criminal damage is the most frequently 
experienced heritage crime. More than one in eight of all the surveyed heritage assets suffered criminal 
damage in the relevant twelve months: this type of crime made up about two-thirds of all heritage crimes, 
and if this rate is applied to all the designated heritage assets in the country it suggests that there are about 
60,000 cases per year of criminal damage to heritage assets in England.  
  
Heritage assets in deprived areas are considerably more at risk of criminal damage; in addition the slightly 
raised risk in areas with fewer historic assets – low HBE areas – can be put down to these areas also being 
more deprived on average. The other crime type that has a notable impact on some areas is metal theft. 
The variation between area types in this case is not by whether the historic asset is in a deprived area but 
by how many other historic buildings are nearby: those assets in areas of low HBE – such as many suburbs 
– are at higher risk. On a wider scale, metal theft is notably more prevalent in the North. Table 5 also shows 
the relative prevalence of a residual category that includes arson and this too varies by region, but here the 
numbers involved are probably too small to place much weight on the differing prevalence by area.  
 
Table 5   Percent of heritage asset owners/guardians recalling heritage crime by type (2010-11) 
% metal theft criminal damage arson/other 
England 4.3 13.1 2.3 
    
London 3.1 10.9 0.0 
rest of South 3.2 15.0 5.3 
Midlands 2.8 12.8 0.7 
North 7.8 13.1 2.0 
    
high IMD 4.8 21.9 1.6 
middling IMD 4.0 10.6 2.6 
low IMD 4.1 7.7 2.6 
    
high HBE 3.4 10.7 2.7 
middling HBE 3.3 13.3 1.7 
low HBE 6.6 16.8 2.4 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
 
The crimes database collated from various secondary sources (Annex 2) also found that criminal damage 
makes up the bulk of all heritage crime, and that metal theft is a heritage crime whose high frequency 
warrants separate consideration. These observations based on the crimes database support the evidence 
from the survey of heritage asset owners/guardians and so add some confidence to the following key 
findings for this section of the report. 
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 criminal damage makes up the bulk of all heritage crime 
 the risk of criminal damage to heritage assets is substantially greater in more deprived areas  
 metal theft is the other heritage crime whose frequency warrants separate consideration 
 metal theft is higher where historic assets are few, and in particular in the North 
 
 
 3.4  What types of heritage asset are most affected by crime? 
 
Table 6 repeats the breakdown into crime types (Table 5) of the crimes recalled be heritage asset owners 
and guardians (and as before, the sum of the values for the three heritage crime types tend to exceed 
those of total – “ANY” – heritage crime because the latter is the proportion of respondents who had recalled 
any such crime, and some recalled not only more than one crime, including some crimes of different types). 
Here the crime types are cross-tabulated against heritage asset types: it will be seen that some types are 
not shown. Registered Battlefields are not amenable to survey by telephone so, as with assets in the 
marine environment, are basically unrepresented here. There are some assets in World Heritage Sites 
which were covered by the survey, but they are relatively few and can all be included in other categories 
(eg. as also being Listed Buildings). Table 6 shows the Registered Parks & Gardens entries in italics 
because the survey obtained only 22 respondents of this type and this is too few from which to draw 
confident conclusions about crimes at this type of heritage asset. It should also be noted that this category 
included several cases where the asset owner/guardian could have referred to a crime that had occurred 
outside the actual Park & Garden, because this asset is part of a property which also includes, for example, 
a historic house that is a Listed Building (and possibly some other heritage assets too).  
  
There is not a very great variation in overall heritage crime risk between the four heritage asset types other 
than the Registered Parks & Gardens. Scheduled Monuments proved distinctive in not having criminal 
damage as the predominant risk they face: in fact ASB was the single most frequently cited type of incident 
for this type of heritage asset. Emphasis on ASB was also seen in responses from Grade I and II* Listed 
Buildings (and yet ASB incidents were cited less than half as often from Grade II Listed Buildings).  
  
Table 6 shows that for all the heritage asset types other than Scheduled Monuments, criminal damage was 
the most frequently cited of the three types of heritage crimes. In fact there is relatively little variation in the 
apparent risks faced by these heritage asset types (after setting aside the more distinctive results from the 
few cases of Registered Parks & Gardens). The fact that metal theft is not a notable risk for Conservation 
Area buildings that are not listed is probably due to many being more recently constructed houses which 
include little lead in their fabric.  
 
Table 6   Percent of asset owners/guardians recalling any heritage crime, by asset type (2010-11) 
% metal theft 
criminal 
damage arson/other 
ANY heritage 
crime ASB 
Scheduled Monuments 3.5 7.1 9.4 15.3 11.8 
Registered Parks & Gardens 13.6 22.7 4.5 31.8 18.2 
Listed Grade I or II* 6.7 16.0 1.3 22.7 20.0 
Listed Grade II 5.2 13.9 0.8 18.3 9.9 
Conservation Areas 1.1 12.6 1.1 14.9 12.0 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
 
The overwhelming majority of cases in the collated crimes database relate to Listed Buildings, and for the 
media especially, it is Grade I and II* buildings that feature most heavily. At the opposite extreme are cases 
of heritage crimes relating to non-listed buildings in Conservation Areas, because these were the least 
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likely to be identified from secondary sources. The collated crimes database found not only Listed Buildings 
but also Scheduled Monuments to be at risk from some owners, with almost 2,000 cases of unauthorised 
changes to heritage assets. One key source was the English Heritage CONCASE database monitoring 
Scheduled Monuments which features many reports by English Heritage officers and partner agencies 
documenting heritage damage caused by owners. 
   
The following are the key findings in this section of the report. 
 variation in overall heritage crime risk was slight between most heritage asset types 
 criminal damage is the main heritage crime risk for Listed Buildings and in Conservation Areas 
 damage by owners due to unauthorised changes is a non-trivial element of the total picture 
 metal theft is not a great risk to buildings in Conservation Areas that are not individually designated  
 Scheduled Monuments are different in being at rather low risk of metal theft and criminal damage, 
and higher risk of other crime such as unauthorised metal detecting 
 
 
3.5  What type of heritage crime most affects each type of heritage asset?   
 
Table 7 repeats the analysis presented in the previous sub-section of this report, but here categorises the 
surveyed heritage assets by their use type. There were a reasonable number of responses from all these 
six use types, although the 39 heritage assets categorised as public buildings provide data on which a little 
less confidence can be placed.  
  
It is notable that there is a wider variation in overall heritage crime risk between the use types (Table 7) 
than there was between the four heritage asset types other than the Registered Parks & Gardens (Table 6). 
Religious buildings stand out as facing the greatest risk, while farms and to a lesser extent residential 
buildings are at relatively low risk. Part of this pattern may be explained by difference in the amount of time 
such buildings are unoccupied (although if this factor was the sole ‘driver’ of relative risk then buildings that 
are both commercial and residential would experience lower risk than those which are solely commercial, 
but the results here show the opposite differential). It is notable that ASB risk rates quite closely match 
those of total heritage crime when the heritage assets are categorised in this way (Table 7). 
 
For all the use types except farms, criminal damage was the most frequently cited type of heritage crime. 
Most use types have a crime risk profile quite closely mirroring the overall pattern where criminal damage 
accounts for the bulk of the recalled heritage crimes, but about 8 or 9 out of every 10 respondents recalled 
no such incidents in the last twelve months.   
  
What stands out here then is the experience of religious buildings. One in four of those surveyed recalled 
criminal damage, and one in seven cited metal theft in the preceding twelve months. As a result, three out  
  
Table 7   Percent of asset owners/guardians recalling any heritage crime, by use type (2010-11) 
 metal theft 
criminal 
damage arson/other 
ANY heritage 
crime ASB 
Residential 3.4 10.6 2.4 13.9 9.6 
Commercial 3.9 15.2 0.0 18.5 12.4 
residential & commercial 3.0 17.9 1.5 20.9 20.9 
Religious 14.3 25.0 1.8 37.5 14.3 
Public 2.6 7.7 5.1 15.4 15.4 
Farm 1.6 3.3 8.2 9.8 8.2 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
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of every eight heritage assets that are churches or related buildings have suffered heritage crime in a year. 
As for arson, analysis of press reports found by the web survey suggests that arson that affects heritage 
assets is mainly impacting on those which are not in use at the time and/or are in a derelict state. 
  
The key findings in this section of the report are summarised below. 
 criminal damage is the main heritage crime risk for all use types of heritage assets except farms 
 religious buildings stand out with their higher risk of criminal damage and, most notably, metal theft  
 some of the evidence points to a higher risk for buildings that are unoccupied for more of the time 
 otherwise the risk ‘profile’ by heritage crime types and ASB does not vary greatly by building usage 
 
 
3.6  What can be said on the extent of different types of impact of heritage crime? 
 
One of the advantages of the mixed methods approach taken in this study was that different types of data 
collected could offer different types of insight. For example, some evidence on ‘personal’ impacts of crime 
can be gleaned from the e-survey whose completely free text field allowed people to describe any impacts 
in their own words. Although this is essentially uncorroborated evidence it does add to understanding of the 
way victimisation can cause distress. Potentially wider impacts on the wider community include the familiar  
example of churches now being routinely kept closed after being repeatedly victimised when left unlocked. 
A more contentious case of possible impacts of repeat victimisation involves Great Barr Hall and Chapel.  
“A charitable building trust has been accused of deliberately allowing an 18th century Gothic 
mansion to fall into disrepair so it can build expensive new homes on a valuable site on the  
edge of Birmingham [which]…has been the target of vandals and been hit by several other fires”13 
 
The cost of repairs after some crimes may not be affordable, especially if the level of risk faced had made 
insurance premiums too costly. It may also be that there are additional costs beyond those of direct repairs, 
especially if the repairs become delayed. The following is just one example. 
 “A church in Hampshire faces a Christmas without its organ because thieves have repeatedly  
stolen lead from the roof. The resulting water damage has ruined the organ at St Mary's Church  
in Andover and it will cost tens of thousands of pounds to repair.”14 
 
Some of the heritage crime case data from press articles that were found through web searches included 
estimates of the cost of damage caused by some crimes. It is important to note that crimes reported in local 
press articles can be expected to be biased towards more noteworthy, and hence probably more extensive, 
examples of heritage crime (nb. this characteristic will probably be shared by some other potential sources 
of crime data, such as insurance claims which will also often exclude minor incidents). Table 8 shows the 
results of analysing the reports, found by the web searches, which estimated the cost of a heritage crime. 
The huge difference in the average cost of the arsons and of the metal thefts may be partly due to these 
reports limiting their estimated costs to those which were immediately apparent; for example this could  
 
Table 8   Published reports of heritage crime costs (2006-11)   
 no. of crime reports stating cost  average stated cost (£) 
arson 9  535,278  
lead theft 114  29,719  
copper theft 10  12,445  
source: CURDS analyses of published reports stating costs of heritage crimes 
                                                 
13 www.birminghampost.net/news/west-midlands-news/2011/03/11/charitable-trust-accused-of-allowing-
great-barr-hall-to-decay-65233-28322212/#ixzz1mYSiKnrQ  
14 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-16227578 
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result in the estimates not including substantial subsequent costs of damage caused by water penetration 
following the theft of lead from a roof. 
  
The evidence from the crime database that arson has a very substantial cost impact derives from rather 
few cases and this suggests that arson is relatively rare (nb. the survey of heritage asset owners/guardians 
also found that the risk of arson was low). At the same time, it may well be that arson is the crime type 
which tends to cause the greatest damage to the historic fabric of a heritage asset. Several cases in the 
heritage crime database involved arson where the building was either completely destroyed or left such that 
it was judged to be beyond repair. One case reported in the media was Peckforton Castle (Cheshire). 
  “Such was the severity of the fire, appliances were called in from four different counties amid fears 
the blaze would completely destroy the Grade I-listed property.”15 
 
One of the datasets collated by this study which did put a monetary value on the impact of the heritage 
crimes that it covered was supplied by BT and related to their Listed call boxes. This dataset provided 
comprehensive statistics on attacks on these call boxes, both to steal the cash and as vandalism: only the 
latter type of attack is taken here as heritage crime, due to this threatening the historic fabric. As well as the 
count of such attacks there is cost given for the repairs, and it is these values that have been analysed here 
as a measure of impact.  
  
Table 9 shows that once again there is strong evidence of greater problems in more urban areas and more 
deprived neighbourhoods, with the most at risk boxes being those in areas where they seem to be among 
very few historic elements of the local built environment (ie. low HBE LSOAs). It is worth noting that in fact 
these variations are almost entirely due to the probability of attack, because the average cost of repairs 
varies very little between types of area. These figures cover only 12 months so it can be seen that in some 
areas annual costs at this rate will accumulate into appreciable sums, although for most areas the costs are 
not high. All the same, the total cost to BT was over £120,000 in the 12 month period covered by the data.  
 
Table 9   BT costs of repairing vandalism attacks on Listed call boxes (2009-10)    
 £ cost / box 
England 52.16 
  
London 141.86 
rest of South 27.23 
Midlands 32.41 
North 71.91 
  
high IMD 164.84 
middling IMD 45.04 
low IMD 19.41 
  
high HBE 41.09 
middling HBE 125.26 
low HBE 207.35 
source: CURDS analyses of comprehensive data from BT [n=unpublished] 
 
By contrast to the specificity of the data on call boxes, the survey of heritage asset owners and guardians 
provides a broad coverage of asset types but no measurement of impact in terms of costs. When a survey 
respondent recalled a crime they were asked to assess its impact in terms of one of four summary views, 
with the analyses here taking as substantial impact any cases with an answer of “significantly worse” or just 
                                                 
15 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8585542/Peckforton-Castle-groom-held-over-historic-hotel-
arson-after-wedding-bill-row.html 
24 
 
“worse” to at least one of the categories of impact they were asked about. (The four impact categories were 
appearance, personal use, friend/family use, and personal enjoyment of the heritage asset: initial analyses 
looked at these separately but – so far as the small numbers involved were reliable – they showed very 
similar patterns of values.) 
 
Table 10 presents the results in terms of the percentage of all respondents concerned with that heritage 
asset type. As a result, these values are a ‘sub-set’ of those in Table 6: they show the proportion of the 
respondents who not only recalled such a crime but also considered that it had made that heritage asset 
(significantly) worse in terms of at least one of the four impact categories. Criminal damage is the major 
issue here, as it was purely in terms of the level of incidence (Table 6). Setting aside the value for the 
Registered Parks and Gardens – which are based on fewer observations – Grade I and II* Listed Buildings 
appears to be the asset type most impacted by crime, although the differentials are relatively slight.  
 
Table 10   Percent of heritage asset owners/guardians affected by crimes, by asset type (2010-11) 
% metal theft 
criminal 
damage arson/other 
ANY heritage 
crime ASB 
Scheduled Monuments 1.2 7.1 2.4 8.2 2.4 
Registered Parks & Gardens 4.5 13.6 0.0 18.2 0.0 
Listed Grade I or II* 1.3 9.3 0.0 10.7 4.0 
Listed Grade II 1.2 6.0 0.0 7.1 2.0 
Conservation Areas 0.0 6.9 0.6 7.4 2.9 
all 1.0 7.1 0.5 8.2 2.5 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
 
 
The key findings in this section of the report are summarised below. 
 variation in risk of higher impact crime was slight between most heritage asset types 
 criminal damage is the main risk leading to impact on all asset types  
 arson is infrequent but can have huge monetary costs and damaging impacts on the fabric 
 metal theft can also have significant ‘secondary’ effects beyond the direct cost of replacement 
 evidence on BT Listed call boxes shows repair costs per incident varying little by area, but incidence 
varies in the ways seen before (higher in more urban, more deprived and less historic areas) 
 
 
3.7  What is known about links between socio-economic trends and recent trends in heritage crime? 
 
The principal problem when trying to answer this question is that there is no robust evidence on the recent 
trends in heritage crime generally. This study sought to produce a first measure of the extent of heritage 
crime and, in addition, to assess how it varies between different types of heritage asset in different areas. 
The measures produced are from a survey which asked about crime and ASB incidents over the previous 
12 months as a whole. It was not reliable to ask about prior years because the proportion of incidents which 
people recall declines over time. As a result, it will only be possible to assess trends in heritage crime when 
a similar data collection process is repeated in successive periods. In the present study, what can be done 
is limited to a specific type of heritage crime for which information from several years is already available. 
  
There has been considerable speculation that metal theft has been increasing over recent years as a direct 
result of globally escalating prices for metals such as lead and copper. For example, a recent study16 for the 
Church of England drew this conclusion. For this study the Ecclesiastical Insurance Group made available 
                                                 
16
 www.churchcare.co.uk/pdf_view.php?id=246  
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data on claims resulting from thefts of metal – mostly lead – from churches in a sample of five Counties. 
Figure 4 shows trends by County over the last 5 years and the most striking feature is the similarity in the 
trends for each area, as would be expected when a key explanatory factor is a fluctuating metal price which 
does not vary appreciably between areas. In fact the declines from 2008 to 2009 and steady rises since 
that low point are a direct parallel to the trend17 in the price of lead. 
 
Figure 4 Trends in numbers of insurance claims due to metal theft from churches (2007-11) 
 
source: CURDS analysis of sample data from Ecclesiastical Insurance Group [n=1539] 
 
 
These arguments about the metal price rise driving a growth in metal theft may implicitly assume that the 
thieves have switched to this target from other acquisitive crime, because the recent national crime data 
analysed by the Home Office18 did not find an overall growth in theft:  
[s]ome commentators have been expecting to see rises in acquisitive crime due to the recent recession 
and the related rise in unemployment. However, despite difficult economic conditions these latest 
statistics show no consistent evidence of upward pressure across the range of acquisitive crime. 
  
The key findings in this section of the report are summarised below. 
 the trend itself remains uncertain 
 little is confidently known of factors ‘driving’ heritage crime trends generally 
 it appears that metal theft is a growing problem, and this is linkable to wholesale metal price trends 
 overall acquisitive crime levels may have changed little, but a ‘diversion‘ to metal theft may also 
mean a ‘diversion’ towards heritage crime because of the amount of lead on historic roofs. 
                                                 
17
 www.metalprices.com/pubcharts/Public/Lead_Price_Charts.asp  
18
 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011  
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4 Summary Conclusions 
 
This final part of the report begins by summarising the evidence-based findings related to each of the six 
questions that were posed. This is followed by a drawing together of observations and recommendations 
about data collection: ‘what works’ and when it may be valuable to repeat information gathering research. 
By way of conclusion there are a small number of reflections on broader issues related to tackling heritage 
crime as well as on some possibilities presenting themselves for further research. 
 
 
4.1  Summary of findings from the evidence compiled by this study 
  
Before turning to the six specific questions on various aspects of the scale and nature of heritage crime, 
there is an opportunity to use the survey data from the research to estimate the overall scale of heritage 
crime over the last 12 months that heritage asset owners/guardians were asked about. This estimate takes 
overall heritage crime rates for each asset type and applies them to the national total number of each type 
of heritage asset. Table 11 shows such an estimate for the relevant year is nearly 75,000 crimes against 
individually designated heritage assets, or more than 200 on an average day. These seem large numbers 
but in fact the victimisation rate of approaching 1 in 5 is not out of keeping with the values reported by the 
general population – that is, people who are mostly not heritage asset owners or guardians – in the annual 
British Crime Surveys.  
  
In interpreting these results it should be recalled that this study has concluded that the datasets here might 
have substantially under-reported some crime types (eg. unauthorised changes to listed building by their 
owners and the whole ‘sector’ of heritage crime in a marine environment that was set aside early in this 
report as too problematic to cover). Table 11 also excludes non-designated buildings in Conservation Areas 
which the stratified survey has in fact covered. Table 11 has to exclude them because there is no robust 
count of their number (‘population’) so estimating a total number of crimes that they experience between 
them cannot be done very reliably. Annex 1 Table B does provide a very preliminary estimation procedure 
of their number, and multiplying this by the crime rate reported in the survey suggests there could be three 
crimes against non-designated properties in Conservation Areas for every one against a designated asset.  
 
Table 11   Estimate of the scale of heritage crime nationally (2010-11) 
Heritage Asset types ‘population’ % recalling ANY heritage crime    estimated total 
Registered Parks & Gardens 1617 31.8 514 
Scheduled Monuments 19749 15.3 3022 
Listed Buildings Grade I or II* 30996 22.7 7036 
Listed Buildings Grade II 344473 18.3 63039 
source: CURDS calculations from survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
 
 
How prevalent is heritage crime in different types of area? 
Heritage assets located in central urban areas face the risks that all buildings in such areas face, and this 
risk is greater where historic assets are few, and generally in more deprived areas. Heritage crime risk 
does not vary very consistently between broad regions of England (eg. between the North and the South). 
 
What type of heritage crime is most prevalent?  
Heritage assets experience more criminal damage than other forms of crime. The risks of criminal damage 
are substantially greater in more deprived areas. Arson is much rarer than other forms of criminal damage 
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(but causes more devastating loss). As for theft, over the past 12 months lead was overwhelmingly the 
most frequent target; metal theft is higher in areas where historic assets are few, and particularly in the 
North. There were very few artefact thefts reported. Another form of crime facing heritage assets that had 
been highlighted by the National Strategic Assessment was vehicle nuisance, but this did not emerge in the 
survey as a widespread problem (nb. no survey with a relatively limited sample size can be expected to find 
instances of crimes that may not happen very frequently but can have a major impact when they do occur).  
 
Which types of heritage asset are most affected by crime? 
The variation in overall heritage crime risk was slight between most heritage asset types. For most types 
criminal damage is the main risk, and especially so for Listed Buildings and others in Conservation Areas. 
Metal theft is not so great a risk to buildings in Conservation Areas that are not individually designated.   
 
What type of heritage crime most affects each type of heritage asset? 
Scheduled Monuments are at rather low risk of metal theft and also not among the most at risk of criminal 
damage but may be at higher risk of unauthorised metal detecting. Churches are the heritage asset type 
which is most at risk from lead theft. The damage caused by owners making unauthorised changes to listed 
buildings is a non-trivial element of the total risk to historic assets.  
 
What can be said on the extent of different types of impact of heritage crime?  
Impact of crime overall varies rather little between most of the heritage asset types, and criminal damage 
was the main risk leading to significant impact for all asset types. Arson is infrequent but can impact not 
only as a huge monetary cost but also in severely damaging the historic fabric, while metal theft too risks 
‘secondary’ impact beyond the direct cost of replacement.   
 
What is known about links between socio-economic trends and recent trends in heritage crime? 
The crucial point here may be that, given the limited research prior to the present study, the trend itself 
remains uncertain: this study sought to establish some form of benchmark (as a starting point for potential 
future trend monitoring). As a result, it is difficult to discuss factors ‘driving’ overall heritage crime trends. 
That said, it appears that metal theft is a growing problem and that this is linked to wholesale metal price 
trends. Wider evidence suggests that acquisitive crime overall has not been increasing (as may have been 
expected with the economic downturn) but there may have been displacement to metal theft which in turn 
may mean a displacement into heritage crime because of the lead on historic roofs in particular. Either way, 
it is clear that any raised risk due to current economic conditions will occur at a time when cuts in the public 
sector are likely to reduce the already stretched monitoring and level of protection for heritage assets. 
 
 
4.2  Conclusions related to possible future change in policies to tackle heritage crime 
  
Is it possible to instigate common practices in heritage crime data recording? 
A strong case can be made for “heritage crime” to be made identifiable in police national computer data, 
but how can this best be achieved? Whilst data coding categories can be changed (as with the recent 
separating out of metal theft from infrastructure), the most directly relevant enhancement of official crime 
recording could be to introduce the question of whether any heritage asset was affected by the crime. 
Agreed terminology allows keyword searches to be efficient and to yield robust results, but in fact differing 
terminology was not a very significant barrier to creating the collated crime case database of this study. 
This database structure may provide a useful template which could be publicised through ARCH as one 
possible form of good practice that other data collectors might ‘migrate’ towards in time. It can also be the 
framework for new databases, recommended to organisations not currently recording heritage crimes. 
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Using such tools can help local heritage crime Key Individual Networks or Community Safety Partnerships 
develop a shared understanding of the key threats to heritage assets locally.   
  
Are there implications from the study for broader issues related to heritage crime? 
The most fundamental question – which has not been addressed by this study – is whether “heritage crime” 
should be specifically recognised in law, rather than be covered either directly or in part by a large number 
of separate strands of legislation. In fact a major Appendix to a recent review19 led by the British Academy 
was needed just to summarise the complex legislative framework relevant to heritage theft. Several of the 
other types of heritage crime covered by this study only fall within the remit of general laws, and this means 
that there would be no specific extra sanction if such a crime impacts on an irreplaceable historic asset, 
rather than on the fabric of a building which is neither historic nor distinguished architecturally.  
 
 
4.3  Some potential future research opportunities building on the evidence compiled by this study 
  
Should there be continual or repeated heritage crime data collection? 
The conclusions in the second part of this report summarised the value in practice of the various data 
collection procedures evaluated in this study. As a result, it is possible to conclude that the following 
sources are, for various reasons, unlikely to produce statistical data from which robust estimates of national 
prevalence can be produced (at least in the immediate future). 
 insurers   (a potentially valuable source, but commercial restrictions limit access) 
 local authorities   (very variable response to unlawful development, and to the survey) 
 heritage interest groups  (limited response to the e.survey but it seems little data is held in fact) 
 major asset owners  (few if any have substantial consistent datasets available for research)  
 general public   (ideally approached officially, for example by the British Crime Survey) 
Heritage Asset owners and guardians could be re-surveyed on a regular basis, but the value of this will 
depend on how the data gathered would be used. Other data gathering efforts would incur lower cost and 
could be a valuable way of keeping abreast of emerging concerns: one example would be web searches, 
and they are also likely to yield illustrative materials on heritage crimes. Some further information gathering 
will be more justifiable as part of partnership building activities, rather than as a source of statistical data. 
This more modest aspiration is also sensible given the considerable research effort needed to limit the 
inevitable duplication that arises if trying to combine into one database the information drawn from several 
sources of which more than one may refer to the same heritage crime. 
  
Are there other opportunities for improving intelligence on heritage crime? 
Partnership working may be the way forward to improve the available evidence base at relatively low cost. 
Police Forces have the technical skills required to perform analysis on data they already have: a pilot study 
with an interested Force could assess the potential for determining whether crimes are heritage crimes 
from their recorded location (as with the test case in Northumbria mentioned in Annex 2). If crime records 
held by the Police are to become the focus for future heritage crime research then it would help if heritage 
asset owners and guardians were to consistently report incidents: in the survey reported here around 1 in 3 
of the crimes that were recalled had not been reported (and this proportion hardly altered when the crimes 
considered were limited to those that were said to have had a notable impact on the value of the asset).  
  
                                                 
19
 www.britac.ac.uk/policy/History-for-the-taking.cfm  
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Should there be other heritage crime research studies following up points raised here? 
The first step beyond the present study needs to be a reflection on the empirical findings here, to work out 
what questions remain or are newly arising. Sharing the results with ARCH may stimulate some partnership 
working but in these ‘hard pressed’ times it is essential to focus on what can actually be done that could 
reduce heritage crime, and then to identify the information needed to support and/or direct those activities. 
So far as further ‘sizing of the problem’ is concerned, the present study has acknowledged its failure to gain 
much evidence on heritage crime in the marine environment or on unauthorised metal detecting. It has also 
been noted that there is no robust basis for estimating the true scale of unlawful development to heritage 
assets by owners or guardians. A separate detailed study would be required to establish the prevalence of 
such development and seek an understanding of the causes in different contexts. The study could also 
explore owner views of detection risk, and the scale of penalties that will be needed to be a real deterrent.  
 
Comparative research with other countries of the British Isles 
It is relevant to note that the lack of consistent data on crimes affecting heritage assets extends to other 
parts of the United Kingdom and also to the Republic of Ireland (which has a bilateral agreement with 
Northern Ireland). All the same, some new comparative studies could indicate whether some of the patterns 
in heritage crime found in this study are not limited to England, although such studies would need to take 
into account the variations in legislation between different jurisdictions. Treasure legislation provides one 
example of this problem: there is a requirement in Northern Ireland for a license to be obtained before any 
form of excavation can take place, while in Scotland Treasure Trove operates differently again, so that a far 
wider range of artefacts fall under legal requirements20 for reporting than is the case in England and Wales. 
Perhaps the ideal basis for future research would be for future British Crime Survey to include an indicator 
of the heritage status (or otherwise) of the location of each respondent, building this dimension into its 
sample stratification so that robust analyses could be conducted not only on the results from the next year 
but also on trends over subsequent years.
                                                 
20
 www.treasuretrovescotland.co.uk 
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Annex 1   Survey by telephone of a stratified sample of historic asset owners and guardians  
 
Stratification 
In order to achieve a statistically robust sample of heritage assets we sorted LSOAs into 36 area types. 
These types were defined by the intersection of the following three dimensions. 
 4 broad territories: London; rest of South; North; Midlands 
 3 levels of deprivation: high; middling; low IMD 
 3 levels of the measure of historic built environment (HBE): high; middling; low 
Random numbers were used to order LSOAs within each of the 36 area types, and within each of these 
heritage assets were identified. 
 
Survey 
The process was iterative. 
 Contact details were compiled for as many heritage assets as possible near the top of each list 
 Responses were sought from within each of the 36 area types from a broad mix of asset types 
(Grade 1, II* and II, other buildings in Conservation Area) and asset uses (non-domestic uses such 
as public houses, churches, tourist attractions and shops, plus dwellings such as farmhouses, 
houses, cottages and flats) 
 There was a boosted sample of key listed buildings and Parks and Gardens (mainly from the 
Historic Houses Association web-site) 
 Scheduled Monuments were covered in the same way so far as possible using the post code of the 
identified contacts on the database from English Heritage 
 
Response 
In practice it was found much easier to find contact details for more buildings with a non-domestic use but 
this was countered so far as possible by monitoring progress within the stratification design and ‘skipping’ 
potential cases that would have led to over-sampling of non-domestic use buildings. Table A shows the 
achieved sample in terms of the major stratification criteria. 
 
Table A Achieved sample in telephone survey of heritage asset owners/guardians (2010-11) 
 
  
Scheduled 
Monuments 
Registered Parks 
& Gardens 
Listed Buildings 
Grade I or II* 
Listed Buildings 
Grade II 
Conservation 
Areas Total 
England 85 22 47 280 175 609 
          
London 11 0 1 77 39 128 
rest of South 28 18 27 56 58 187 
Midlands 20 1 6 75 39 141 
North 26 3 13 72 39 153 
          
high IMD 28 0 1 93 65 187 
middling IMD 30 15 23 96 63 227 
low IMD 27 7 23 91 47 195 
          
high HBE 29 22 47 96 67 261 
middling HBE 30 0 0 92 59 181 
low HBE 26 0 0 92 49 167 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians  
 
 
Strengths 
The stratification of the survey makes this the only source for measuring the prevalence of heritage crime.  
It provides a broad range of relevant variables including 
 coverage of both reported and unreported heritage crimes 
 the characteristics of heritage assets affected by crime and of those unaffected 
 the impact of crimes on victims. 
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Weaknesses 
It proved difficult and costly to identify owner details (and many owners are ex-directory or with no landline). 
Numerous asset names on English Heritage databases do not match their locally used names. 
A significant proportion of the supplied post codes do not match the actual post codes. 
English Heritage database of Scheduled Monument owners/guardians is very out of date. 
A small minority of heritage asset owners (under 1%) expressed a concern about being contacted. 
 
Recommendations 
A robust stratified sample of heritage assets would be critical to any future updating of this baseline data. 
Such a repeat exercise would be greatly helped by 
 updating of English Heritage Scheduled Monument owner / manager database 
 updating of other databases to reflect changes in names given locally to assets and their addresses 
 English Heritage staff being informed by the PAO of the need for and process of the survey 
 each local English Heritage office should be asked to tell the research team about any specific 
asset owners considered to be potentially sensitive about a telephone interview. 
 
Analysis 
When analysing the results from the survey it is possible to either use the responses as they are, or to try 
weighting them to reflect the size of the wider heritage asset ‘population’ they were intended to represent. 
Table B illustrates how such a weighting could be implemented with the data from this survey. 
 
Table B Illustrative example of weighting analysis (2010-11) 
 
Heritage asset types Heritage Counts 2011 ‘population’  sample   weighting 
Registered Parks & Gardens 1610   22 73.2 
Scheduled Monuments 19749  85 232.3 
Listed Buildings 375121  326 1150.7 
Conservation Area* 1500000 # 176 8522.7 
World Heritage Sites:                      surveyed heritage assets in these were allocated to more specific categories 
Historic Battlefields & Protected Wreck Sites:                                                          not amenable to phone survey 
*properties in Conservation Areas which are not in any other category of HA 
# estimate based on 750 properties in each of 2000 LSOAs (those with 1(+) OA totally in a  Conservation Area) 
               example analysis     
  
observed crime rate 
  Registered Parks & Gardens    63.6 
  Scheduled Monuments    22.4 
  Listed Buildings     35.0 
  Conservation Area*     30.1 
       
  Total (weighted by sample size) 32.86 
  Total (weighted by Counts) 31.02 
source: CURDS survey of heritage asset owners and guardians [n=609] 
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Annex 2  Crime case record data collection processes 
 
 
Table C provides an overview of the data sources pursued when compiling records of heritage crime cases, 
showing also how many cases – if any – that each source did ultimately provide (nb. the remainder of the 
Annex summarises strengths and weaknesses of specific sources). It should be noted that some of the 
data sources may originally have included more cases than the numbers cited here: this is because some 
had to be deleted as part of the research efforts to limit the inevitable duplication that arises when collating 
information from a range of sources of which several may refer to the same heritage crime (eg. a media 
report and an insurance claim). 
 
 
Table C  Summary of the sources providing crime case records (dates as in the original sources) 
 
Type of source Data source  No. of crime records  
Web Searches 
searches for unauthorised development: 106 
495 searches for heritage crimes 389 
Surveys 
e-survey 182 
1,769 
heritage asset owner/guardian survey 283 
Local Planning Authority enforcement officer survey 1,304 
Planning Processes 
Planning Inspectorate 540 
553 Institute of Historic Buildings Conservation 13 
English Heritage 
CONCASE 480 
694 
Heritage Crime team 156 
Paces of Worship at risk 58 
Church of England 
Bradford Parishes 20 
 
414 
Southwell and Nottingham Diocese 311 
Birmingham Diocese 41 
Lichfield Diocese 42 
Local Authorities Chester and Cheshire West 146 146 
ARCH members 
that major owners 
of heritage assets 
National Trust 2,279 
16,916 
British Waterways Board 291 
BT (call boxes) 14,346 
Amenity Societies  
War Memorials Trust 36 
59 Milestone Society 23 
Insurers 
NFU 75 
2,319 EIG 2,244 
Product Providers SmartWater 0  0 
Police Forces 
Hampshire Police 23 
483 Northumbria Police 460 
 TOTAL   23,848 23,848 
source: CURDS analyses of published reports of heritage crimes    
 
 
Web searches 
 
Key word searches were entered into the Google search engine.  Initially the key words used were from the 
heritage crime Controlled Vocabulary but subsequently different words, and different combinations, were 
used to find more examples of heritage crimes.  Over 500 relevant articles relating to 495 crimes, including 
unauthorised development of heritage assets, were found and the details pasted into word files. Relevant 
data was then transferred into the consistent format of the crimes database. 
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Strengths 
Good way of quickly identifying significant recent crime events affecting heritage assets with public access. 
Revealed which heritage crime related issues are of media concern. 
Found photographs and descriptions to graphically portray examples of different forms of heritage crime. 
 
Weaknesses 
Difficult to balance search effort across crime types. 
Likely imbalance in reporting between types of asset use (eg. public houses or churches but not dwellings). 
Some detailed reporting of relatively minor events in some rural areas, by contrast to metropolitan areas. 
Not all locally significant media sources are effectively integrated with the internet. 
 
Recommendations 
Regular searches can keep the Heritage Crime team abreast of recent reporting of heritage crime events. 
An annual web search could be combined with an updating literature review. 
 
 
Contact with members of ARCH 
 
English Heritage provided the research team with a list of current and potential ARCH members who were 
contacted by e-mail initially and, in many cases, followed up with a telephone contact. As the membership 
of ARCH increases and institutional support is built for the Heritage Crime Programme then more 
significant datasets can be expected to emerge. 
 
Strengths  
Efficient way of identifying and obtaining asset or area specific baseline datasets, for example those here 
on metal theft from the rail network (British Transport Police) and damage to or theft from the canal network 
(British Waterways Board) and also Listed call boxes (British Telecom). 
 
Weaknesses 
Some contacts have not supplied the promised data. 
 
Recommendations 
Any future research study should continue to inform ARCH members about the study and enquire about 
any emerging datasets. ARCH members should be encouraged to provide annual updates of the data they 
hold on crime incidents, and any ARCH members who have no such data should be encouraged to build 
and maintain crimes databases. 
 
 
E-survey 
 
In order to maximise the efficiency of data collection and collation from a disparate mix of individuals and 
organisations with a known interest in the nation’s heritage an e-survey was designed. The purpose of the 
e-survey was to identify specific examples of heritage crime. The aspiration was that the e-survey would 
cover voluntary sector clubs, comprising archaeology, heritage and other relevant interest groups. More 
than 600 archaeology, heritage and other specialist interest groups (eg. wreck divers and metal detecting 
clubs) were then contacted via the Council for British Archaeology’s contact database of voluntary groups 
and through specialist online discussion forums, and also other collated contacts of groups known to often 
interact with marine and/or terrestrial heritage assets. They were sent a letter (or e-mail) introducing the 
survey and also providing the e-survey web-link. 
 
All local authority Conservation Officers were sent an equivalent letter with an e-survey web-link while the 
National Association of Planning Enforcement Officers included a link to the e-survey in NAPE News.  
Similarly the Listed Buildings Owners Club sent an e-mail with the link to its 18,500 members, while the 
Country Land and Business Association included a brief article written by the study team in its e-newsletter 
(for 21,000 members). In addition the Fortress Study Group put details of the study in their magazine 
Casemate. 
 
Strengths 
Useful for awareness raising. 
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Relatively low cost to repeat, given the investment made in questionnaire design and building of contacts. 
Can provide information on non-monetary impact of crimes. 
 
Weaknesses 
Despite a large number of interested individuals being notified, the responses yielded 182 crime cases. 
There was some overlap with data already collated (notably from English Heritage). 
Uncertain reliability of data (e.g. different dates for crimes other sources had already identified accurately). 
Limited detail provided on specific crime events. 
 
Recommendations 
Very modest research value of the data means that any repetition would be mostly for awareness raising. 
 
 
Unlawful development survey - Survey of Planning Enforcement officers  
 
After a database of Enforcement Officers was created 332 e-mails were sent, and over 30 were then 
telephoned until 123 local planning authorities had provided data, making a significant contribution to the 
overall database by adding some 1,304 address-specific unauthorised developments relating to heritage 
assets (mostly listed buildings).  
 
Strengths  
The chosen approach was reasonably efficient in contacting local planning authority enforcement teams.  
Some degree of consistency in data obtained notably. 
No duplication of crimes identified, due to separate local jurisdictions. 
In most cases there was a clear indication of the nature of the crime and the location of the property. 
 
Weaknesses 
Moderate response rate only. 
Only a minority of planning authorities could download data covering all unlawful developments to heritage 
assets within the area covered by the local authority.    
Significant degree of uncertainty as to the scale of unauthorised development ‘behind’ the recorded cases. 
Policy difference between authorities over prosecutions and issuing of Listed Building Enforcement Notices. 
Impossible to draw any firm conclusions relating to the prevalence of unlawful development. 
 
Recommendations 
Baseline data too patchy in coverage for replication of survey to be useful in the short term. A more detailed 
study may identify with more certainty the scale of unlawful development in sample areas. Partnership work 
with case study local planning authorities may be able to establish best practice. 
 
 
Planning Inspectorate (Unauthorised Development Appeals) 
 
Over the past 5 years there have been some 536 Listed Building Enforcement Notice Appeals. In a large 
majority of cases the planning enforcement decision was upheld. 
 
Strengths 
Detailed address for all entries on the database including postcode. 
Coverage of the whole of England. 
 
Weaknesses 
The numbers are very small given the potential scope of the unlawful development problem. 
 
Recommendations 
Baseline data too limited to warrant replication in the short term. 
 
 
Institute of Historic Building Conservation  
 
Data downloaded from website produced dataset of 13 prosecutions over past 5 years in combination. 
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Strengths 
Data available via the website. 
 
Weaknesses 
Planning authorities favour a less confrontational approach, hence the paltry number of cases. 
 
Recommendations 
Baseline data far too limited to justify replication (not an indication of the prevalence of heritage crime). 
 
 
Police Forces  
 
Hampshire Police supplied this study data on 23 crimes that had been ‘tagged’ in one part of the Force 
area as heritage crimes: this shows that the uneven treatment of heritage crimes can apply within as well 
as between Police Forces.  
  
Data supplied by Northumbria Police related to 49 church metal thefts over the past 13 months plus over 
400 crimes over the past 5 years on heritage assets in public ownership. The metal theft data had already 
been collated but the remaining data was produced by a query using i2 software (taking no more than 4 
hours). The data supplied covered many relevant data fields, including post code, date of crime, crime type 
and value of loss. GIS software was used by the research team to identify which of these recorded 
locations matched the location of heritage assets included in the NMR. This tested the appropriate ‘buffer 
zone’ around the heritage asset needed to identify correct matches: a zone defined too tightly means that 
genuine matches will be missed due to location recording differences, a zone defined too widely could 
produce false matches.  
 
When applying a 10 metre buffer to recent church metal theft crimes across Northumbria Police Force Area 
7 heritage crimes were missed that a 25 metre buffer was able to identify, but the 10 metre zone found just 
5 false matches, in comparison with 38 using the 25 metre zone. It can be anticipated that different buffer 
sizes may well be more appropriate in different contexts and for different types of assets (for example a 25 
metre buffer around the centroid of a Registered Park or Garden miss crimes occurring near its fringes, 
while the same size buffer in a town square might pick up several unconnected heritage assets).  
 
Strengths  
Detailed data relating to a significant number of heritage crimes. 
High quality information, particularly in relation to location and timing of crimes. 
Potential to quickly and efficiently generate data on selected crimes and selected types of asset affected. 
Accurate recording of location can help in the efficient matching with heritage assets. 
Potentially valuable source to help multi-agency understanding of the prevalence of selected crimes.  
 
Weaknesses 
Data relating to privately owned property might remain difficult. 
The future capacity to extract data from Northumbria Police Force database is not guaranteed.   
The potential for extracting similar data from other Police Force databases is unknown. 
 
Recommendations   
There is potential for research with Kent Police, Northumbria Police and other Police Forces to explore the 
most efficient and effective means of identifying the crimes occurring within the curtilage of heritage assets. 
For example, an agreement with Northumbria Police may lead to the use of their data (matched with NMR) 
as a platform to investigate whether other Police Forces are able to replicate or locally adapt this approach. 
If some other Forces only record location down to post code level then the research could assess how far 
matching heritage asset data with crime data would be more difficult and time consuming, and whether 
many more false positive matches would be generated. 
 
 
Insurance Data  
 
Several contacts were made with leading insurers of heritage assets. NFU Mutual provided data on 75 
thefts over the past 3 years that occurred within the curtilage of their insured heritage asset owners. 
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Several reasons were given by other leading insurers for not being able to supply data: these included 
some technical challenges of integrating different information systems, but also client data protection and 
confidentiality concerns as well as commercial sensitivities (eg. an unwillingness for spatial variation in the 
relative prevalence of claim risk to be known). 
 
Strengths  
Insurance data would be a good way to identify variations in risk levels, and of levels of financial loss. 
For example, church lead theft could potentially be assessed from EIG’s claims data relating to Anglican 
and Methodist churches. 
  
Weaknesses 
It has to date proved very difficult to obtain the data (nb. calculating risk calls for data on the total insured 
population too).  
The only data obtained related to theft, and also was inadequate in its locational coding.  
 
Recommendations 
Continue efforts to establish whether EIG’s claims data relating to Anglican and Methodist churches could 
be made available at a level of disaggregation which would be of more value to the research. 
Despite the potential value of the data, the obstacles in place may prove too severe to be worth tackling. 
 
 
Church of England and other religious organisations 
 
Discussions with the Church of England Church Buildings Council resulted in a letter requesting data on all 
metal thefts; this was e-mailed to the secretary in each Diocese. The data provided covers 414 metal theft 
crimes as follows:  
 42 in the Lichfield Diocese 
 41 in the Birmingham Diocese  
 311 in the Southwell and Nottingham  
 20 metal thefts reported by individual churches and parishes.  
 
Strengths  
Baseline data obtained. 
Establishing contacts opens opportunities to explore further the major problem of metal theft from churches.  
 
Weaknesses 
Coverage is limited to Anglican churches and some areas. 
Data fields do not identify whether the church is a heritage asset, and data on location and timing is patchy.  
There is some under-reporting because minor metal thefts are unlikely to be reported to Diocese. 
 
Recommendations 
More systematic collation of data by all Parishes and Diocese could be encouraged (particularly in areas 
where Police Forces lack the capacity to provide comprehensive data on relevant crime incidents). An area 
with low levels of crime may then be able to negotiate a better deal from insurers, leaving more money for 
the maintenance of historic fabric and other priorities. 
 
 
Product Provider: SmartWater 
 
Contact was made with ‘SmartWater’ who as a leading supplier of coating material which can help detect 
offenders and locate stolen building materials are major supplier to the War Memorials Trust and churches. 
In the event, no data has been supplied to date. It is impossible at this stage to assess the potential quality 
of data from this source. 
 
 
Other Data: BT 
 
A baseline dataset of crimes relating to Listed call box crimes was supplied by BT to the research team. 
14,346 crimes (13,546 criminal damage cases and 800 coin box thefts). 
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Strengths  
Systematic and consistent data relating to listed telephone kiosks relating to coin box theft and vandalism. 
Full national coverage. 
Detailed locational referencing (easting, northing, address and postcode).  
 
Weaknesses 
Owner and asset type specific. 
 
Recommendation 
There would be little cost in obtaining an annual update of crimes from BT and this would not only monitor 
changes in levels of crime affecting call boxes but could also provide a model for partnership building.  
 
 
Other Data: Cheshire West and Chester local authority 
 
A baseline dataset has been obtained from this established contact. 
 
Strengths  
The dataset relates to a range of specific types of crime, specific types of asset and specified areas.  
It illustrates multi-agency data collation helping to achieve a shared understanding of crime prevalence. 
 
Weaknesses 
The dataset is entirely area specific. 
 
Recommendations 
English Heritage may find Chester and Cheshire West provide a valuable exemplar of local best practice. 
Worth exploring with Chester and Cheshire West the use of this data in: 
 protecting heritage assets 
 raising local awareness of the issue 
 local partner refocusing resources to tackle heritage crime priorities / issues 
 charging and prosecution of offenders 
There is scope to build on the co-operation already achieved locally, for example the local Planning 
Enforcement Team to supply data on unauthorised development within heritage asset curtilages.  
 
 
Other Data: CONCASE 
 
Dataset provided by English Heritage with 480 records of damage relating to Scheduled Monuments. 
 
Strengths  
Valuable dataset for establishing examples of unauthorised access, unauthorised changes by owners and 
unauthorised metal detecting. 
Typically clear description of the damage and the cause of the damage. 
 
Weaknesses 
English Heritage have limited resources to regularly inspect Scheduled Monument sites, so some sites may 
not be visited by any agencies from one year to the next.  
Reporting by some partners may be patchy.  
Some owners may under-report damage to sites. 
Uncertainty relating to when crimes occurred. 
 
Recommendations 
Annual download of relevant fields from the CONCASE database is unproblematic.  
 
 
Other Data: National Trust 
 
Summary data providing a count of all crimes by type recorded at National Trust properties yielded 2,279 
crimes recorded since the start of 2006. The possibility of crime type data is currently being investigated. 
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Strengths  
Uncertain because no detailed data relating to specific types of crime and specific assets supplied as yet. 
 
Weaknesses 
Owner specific data which mainly covers Grade I or Grade II* historic houses open to the public. 
 
Recommendation 
The established contacts provide an opportunity to obtain potentially valuable datasets relating to specific 
types of crime, and specific assets, are worth exploring. 
 
 
Other Data: British Waterways Board 
 
A baseline dataset of crimes relating to damage to heritage assets forming part of the canal network.   
 
Strengths  
Systematic and largely consistent data on damage to heritage assets forming part of the canal network. 
Regular checks by staff of changes / damage to the network. 
Full national coverage. 
 
Weaknesses 
Guardian specific. 
Need to find way of transferring data so location of heritage crime can be known to partners. 
 
Recommendation 
There would be little cost in obtaining an annual update of crimes from BWB and this would not only 
monitor changes in levels of crime affecting heritage assets forming part of the canal network but could also 
provide a model for partnership building.  
  
 
Other Data: Places of Worship at risk 
 
Dataset of 58 records of Places of Worship at Risk has been provided. 
 
Strengths  
All records relate to heritage assets. 
 
Weaknesses 
Small dataset with a limited number of data fields. 
Records tend to relate to state of disrepair rather than specific crime incidents. 
Cost of repair rather than value of loss.  
Potential overlap with much more detailed datasets with greater coverage  (eg. Churches or Police Forces).  
 
Recommendation 
No clear value of obtaining an update of this data until more comprehensive database of heritage crime 
available from police records.  If comprehensive data was available then the relative risk to any specific 
group of assets to different forms of heritage crime could be assessed.  
 
 
Other Data: War Memorials Trust 
 
Dataset of 36 records.  
 
Strengths  
National coverage. 
 
Weaknesses 
Very asset type specific. 
Uncertain level of identification of crimes to listed war memorials.  
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Recommendation 
Annual update of data from War Memorials Trust may be valuable. High level of press interest makes this 
form of crime potentially key in raising awareness of heritage crime more generally. 
 
 
Other Data: Milestone Society 
 
Dataset supplied via English Heritage includes 23 records of damage to listed milestones.  
 
Strengths  
National coverage. 
 
Weaknesses 
Very asset type specific, with extremely low numbers. 
 
Recommendation 
No harm in maintaining contact to produce an annual update of data from Milestone Society.  
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Annex 3  Concordance table between Controlled Vocabulary and terms used by the media or others  
Table D categorises terms for types of heritage crime. The key aim is relating the terms in the 2 left-hand 
columns to those in the right-hand columns. The latter [CAPITALISED] show the Controlled Vocabulary21 
and its 3 level hierarchy. In the left-hand columns are the terms identified by this study through its various 
data collation activities and, in particular, from its web searches: these initially used Controlled Vocabulary 
terms but it was clear that many found few cases. Some of these terms are for very specific heritage crimes 
of which extremely few cases were likely to be identified (eg. “illegal artefact dealing”). Some of the other 
Controlled Vocabulary terms are not used in internet items such as media reports (eg. “cultural theft”). 
   
Table D also has a third column which reports on the number of cases in the crime database which fall into 
each of the categories that the left-hand columns identify (nb. this has an “unallocable” category because, 
as explained in Annex 2, the crime database includes incomplete records due to the heterogeneous source 
material drawn on as its sources). What is very evident from these numbers is that some types of heritage 
crime with many cases in the crime database are covered by very few terms in the Controlled Vocabulary 
(eg. unauthorised development); by way of contrast, there are detailed terms in the Controlled Vocabulary 
for some crime types of which very few cases were found (eg. assault). 
 
 
Table D Concordance between the Controlled Vocabulary and more widely used terms 
 
typology in the crime database of this study Controlled Vocabulary hierarchy of terms 
Type sub-type 
crime database 
record number Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Architectural 
theft 
architectural 
theft misc 
37 
REMOVAL OF 
OBJECTS 
THEFT 
 
ARCHITECTURAL 
THEFT 
milestone 22 
slates / tiles 3 
statue theft 4 CULTURAL THEFT 
Arson arson 115 DAMAGE FIRE SETTING   
Artefact theft 
artefact theft 
5 
REMOVAL OF 
OBJECTS 
THEFT CULTURAL THEFT 
unreported 
treasure 
1 
ILLEGAL 
ARTEFACT 
DEALING 
    
Anti-social 
Behaviour 
(ASB) 
public 
urination 
62 
NUISANCE 
BEHAVIOUR 
  
PUBLIC 
URINATION 
  
anti social 
behaviour 
misc. 
23     
threats to 
trespass 
1     
alcohol 
misuse 
1 
SUBSTANCE 
MISUSE 
ALCOHOL 
MISUSE 
  
Assault 
assault staff 1 
ASSAULT 
  
ASSAULT STAFF   
sexual 
assault 
1 
SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 
  
Criminal 
damage 
unauthorised 
excavation 
2 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACTS 
UNLICENCED 
EXCAVATION 
  
agriculture 
works 
1 
DAMAGE 
CRIMINAL 
DAMAGE 
  
criminal 
damage misc 
13772   
damage to 
monument 
13   
Graffiti 68 GRAFFITI   
vandalism 
and ASB 
2 
CRIMINAL 
DAMAGE 
  
                                                 
21
 English Heritage & ALGOA Heritage Sector Group Controlled Vocabulary (October 2011) 
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Marine 
removal of 
objects 
8 
REMOVAL OF 
OBJECTS 
THEFT   
illegal diving 
4 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACCESS 
UNAUTHORIZED 
DIVING 
  
military 
remains 
2 
  
DAMAGE 
    
tampering 
wreck 
2 
CRIMINAL 
DAMAGE 
  
unlawful 
salvage 
1 
REMOVAL OF 
OBJECTS 
THEFT 
UNAUTHORIZED 
SALVAGING 
Metal theft 
bronze 7 
METAL THEFT 
 
brass 6 
copper 25 
ferrous 9 
lead 351 
mixed 13 
not specified 232 
Theft Other 
metal 1 
machinery 5   
theft other 1189   
Unauthorised 
Metal 
Detecting 
unauthorised 
metal 
detecting 
116 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACTS 
UNAUTHORIZED 
METAL 
DETECTING 
  
Other 
drug dealing 
1 
NUISANCE 
BEHAVIOUR 
DRUG DEALING   
drug misuse; 
drug 
paraphanalia 
1 
SUBSTANCE 
MISUSE 
DRUG MISUSE   
off roading 
18 
INAPPROPRIATE 
USE OF 
VEHICLES 
OFF ROADING   
other crime 22       
unauthorised 
access 
9 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACCESS 
    
unauthorised 
excavation 
5 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACTS 
UNLICENCED 
EXCAVATION 
  
urban 
exploration 
2 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACCESS 
URBAN 
EXPLORATION 
  
Unauthorised 
Development 
agriculture & 
forestry 
108 
UNAUTHORIZED 
ACTS 
PLANNING 
BREACHES & 
UNAUTHORISED 
DEVELOPMENT 
  
unauthorised 
development 
1,858   
Unallocable     
All Types 18,129       
source: CURDS analyses of published reports of heritage crimes  
(dates as in the original sources)  
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Glossary of terms and abbreviations used in the report 
 
 
abbreviation or other term           meaning in the context of this study 
 
ARCH Alliance to Reduce Crime against Heritage  
arson/other crimes cited in the stratified survey responses as damaging to 
the historic fabric but which were neither criminal damage nor 
metal theft 
ASB Anti-Social Behaviour: among the stratified survey responses 
the majority of examples were drunken or loutish behaviour 
(eg. excessive noisiness) or littering  
CONCASE English Heritage in-house database recording damage or 
other change to Scheduled Monuments 
Controlled Vocabulary  English Heritage proposal for a set of standard terms to use 
in describing heritage crimes 
crime database collation from various sources (which provided varying levels 
of detail) of information on specific cases of heritage crime 
criminal damage the majority of examples among the stratified survey 
responses were graffiti or other froms of vandalism 
e-survey web-based questionnaire hosted by Bristol Online Surveys: 
invitations to respond were sent to various heritage interest 
groups 
HBE Historic Built Environment: a measure of the proportion of 
buildings in the surrounding area which are heritage assets 
heritage assets designated historic sites covered by this study:  World 
Heritage Sites + Scheduled Monuments + Registered Parks 
and Gardens + Listed Buildings + Conservation Areas 
heritage asset owner/guardian the respondent to the stratified survey who reported on the 
experience of crime at that site 
heritage crime any offence which harms the value of England's heritage 
assets and their settings to this and future generations 
high / middling / low three-way division of all LSOAs in England according to their 
ranking in terms of either HBE or IMD 
IMD Index of Multiple Deprivation: the official measure of the 
relative level of deprivation in each LSOA 
impact categories groupings of responses to the stratified survey questions 
about the impact of a crime on the heritage asset: 
appearance; personal use; friend/family use; personal 
enjoyment of the asset 
Insurers insurance companies specialising in insurance of historic 
buildings (such as churches) 
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Listed Building a part of the built environment that is of special architectural 
and/or historic interest (nb. those of greatest interest are 
designated Grade I) 
London the area covered by the Greater London Authority 
LSOA Lower-layer Super Output Area: grouping of OAs which are 
the smallest area type used for reporting the IMD (there are 
over 32000 in England and they have an average population 
of around 1500) 
major owners of heritage assets organisations with extensive portfolio of designated properties 
(eg. National Trust) 
Midlands East Midlands + West Midlands 
North North East + North West + Yorkshire & the Humber 
OA Output Area: the smallest area type used by the Office For 
National Statistics (there are over 160000 in England and 
they have an average population of 300) 
planning enforcement local authority process in response to breaches of planning 
controls due to building work taking place without the 
necessary permission (eg. Listed Building Consent) 
Product Providers companies specialising in products to protect historic 
buildings against, for example, metal theft 
rest of South East of England + South East + South West 
route miles the number of miles of passenger or freight railway 
(regardless of whether this is single or multiple track) 
stratified survey telephone interviews of heritage asset owners/guardians 
selected as part of a sample frame designed to provide data 
that is representative of the diversity of assets (as in Annex 1) 
survey database consistently completed records from the stratified survey 
town and fringe areas more urbanised areas which are outside continuously built-up 
areas with a population of at least 10,000 
urban areas continuously built-up areas with a population of at least 
10,000 (the official 2001 definition in England) 
villages, hamlets and isolated dwellings areas which are neither urban areas nor town and fringe 
areas 
web survey Google search using crime types and heritage asset types as 
search terms; the retrieved items typically came from local 
and national media or heritage interest group websites 
 
